The fall of the umma resulted from misguidance produced by militant exegesis of revelation by hawkish ulema. The knowledge of Islam was corrupted by the need to provide an interpretation of revelation that would provide the rulers with justification to wage wars of expansion. The corruption began with the perception of reason as an “enemy” of faith by ulema with an aversion to reason. The resulting repression of reason prevented Muslims from comprehending and following revelation. Refraining from reason generated the perception that parts of revelation are “unclear,” “incomplete,” and even "contradictory". But the Book of Allah presents itself as clear, complete and coherent. In response to the alleged "flaws" in the Book of Allah, traditionists turned to manmade books of traditions. These were treated as a “furqan” to “judge,” “abrogate,” and even “replace” parts of the Book of Allah. These expectations rested on the false assumption that tradition, too, is revelation. Unfortunately, in treating tradition as revelation, traditionists fell into "textual shirk." Unwarranted accretions encompass the teachings of predestination and abrogation. The former eliminated individual responsibility and attributes all acts to Allah. The latter assumes that Allah did not protect His Book as He promised. The teaching of abrogation suggests – in defiance of revelation – that Allah “changed His mind.” This is anthropomorphism, as it attributes a personal trait to Allah, that of indecision. Recourse to the teaching of the abrogation of the peace verses by the verse of the sword enabled militant ulema to re-articulate Islam – the religion of peace – as a political agenda for war, endorsing wars of aggression and propagating Islam “by the sword,” in defiance of the teaching of revelation. Policies based the perception that the Book of Allah expects war rather than peace, produced by militant exegesis, provoked retaliation by aggrieved parties. The repression of reason by tradition was sealed with the political triumph of the traditionists in their conflicts with the rationalists. This was a reverse of what transpired in Europe a millennium afterwards, when the "rationalists" of the Age of Reason (Enlightenment) triumphed in their struggles against the adherents of tradition (monarchy). The ruling “worldview” was established by brutal repression both in Islam and the West: a “reign of terror.” This consisted of he slaughter of five thousand philosophers by Musa al-Hadi in 786 and the slaughter of sixteen thousand adherents of tradition by Maximilien Robespierre in 1792, during the Reign of Terror. As a result of its emphasis on freedom and reason, Europe prospered. However, on account of its repression of reason and freedom, the umma regressed. Muslim empires fell under the weight of the backlash triggered by acts of aggression, including the mass murder of the Mongol traders and ambassadors by the Abbasids and the twin attacks on Vienna by the Turks. For "Allah does not love aggressors.” The chief reason for these disasters was that Muslims drifted from the Book of Allah to militant hadiths and hawkish ulema for "guidance." They embarked on wars of aggression or jihad al-talab. This requires Muslims to wage wars on non-Muslims on a yearly basis, even when non-Muslims refrain from assaulting Muslims. But aggression is prohibited in the Book of Allah. In this way, hawkish ulema rendered lawful what Allah made unlawful. They treated wars of aggression to "spread Islam by the sword" as a religious requirement, a "sixth pillar of Islam." As a result of aggression, militant regimes brought catastrophes on themselves and their populations. The backlashes against aggression brought defeats. To renew the Islamic community, it is necessary to return to the Book of Allah, uncontaminated by the weight of unwarranted accretions and distortions. This requires the rehabilitation and re-engagement of reason.

The umma is experiencing trauma because it turned from revelation to tradition. This showed a deficit of trust in revelation and and too much trust in tradition. But Allah says He loves those who put their trust in Him. To turn from revelation to tradition is to trade revealed knowledge for reports of mere persons. Allah said He does not change the condition of people until they first change what is in themselves (13: 11). The turn from revelation to tradition was triggered by an enchantment with tradition. The turn was assisted by the repression of reason. The turn was justified by the assertion that tradition, too, is revelation. However, the sharia is drawn from traditions, too. Accordingly, jurists do not treat tradition merely as wahy. They also treat tradition as tanzil, what Allah “sent down.” But those who do not judge by what Allah “sent down” are identified as unbelievers, rebels, and wrongdoers (5: 44-45, 47). The prophet prohibited recording his sayings. But hawkish rulers, in defiance of the prophet’s prohibition, asked different ulama to record the traditions. The effects were troubling. The Mongols erased the Abbasids when the Abbasid rulers acted according to the tradition which asserts that “the blood of the kafir is halal for the believers.” Based on this tradition, the Abbasids murdered a group of Mongol traders, as well as the ambassadors sent by Genghis Khan to ask for justice. Abandoning the Book of Allah resulted in the deaths of a million persons in the reprisals that followed. Anti-rationalism resulted in the deaths of five thousand philosophers murdered by Musa al-Hadi in 786, during the mihna or inquisition. This was a “reign of terror,” a persecution of philosophers by the followers of traditions. Anti-rationalism plunged Muslims into stupefaction and stagnation. Due to the resulting backwardness, anti-rationalism also rendered the umma vulnerable to external assaults. Reason was subordinated to tradition. Even revelation was subordinated to tradition. The relationship between revelation and tradition in Islam requires attention. For tradition eclipsed revelation. This was an aberration. Traditional jurisprudence teaches that revelation is the first root of legislation, followed by tradition. Yet in exegesis, the relationship between revelation and tradition is reversed. Tradition is placed above revelation. This reversal is expressed in the perceptions that “tradition judges revelation” and that “revelation requires tradition more than tradition requires revelation.” These are troubling pronouncements. For they treat the rulings of persons as more authoritative than the rulings of God. They reflect scriptural shirk. The reversal of the relationship between revelation and tradition encroaches on the pre-eminence of revelation. It represents a breakdown of traditional exegesis and jurisprudence. Tradition went from being mere reports from the past to being treated as “revelation,” a “judge” of the Book of Allah, “abrogating” and even “replacing” parts of the Book. The gradual elevation of tradition to being more authoritative than revelation is an expression of “creeping shirk.” The result is a sharia where reports of persons in a few cases replace revealed rulings. This transpired with the punishments for adultery, apostasy and blasphemy. These punishments do not merely defy the Book of Allah; they result in miscarriages of justice, and attribute an unjustified aura of harshness to the sharia and Muslims generally. Hence, the relationship between revelation and tradition requires being reset. Tradition must be subordinated to revelation. The teaching of abrogation was used to transform the religion of reconciliation into an agenda of territorial expansion and global conquest. Shirk tainted exegesis as well as jurisprudence. The politicisation of research reduced it to the rank of political propaganda. These aberrations require attention.

Anti-rationalism in Islam is responsible for backwardness, corruption of knowledge and the fall of the Muslim empire. The West went through a Reformation and the Age of Reason. Islam also had an Age of Reason. However, it was short-lived, due to a backlash by tradition. Backwardness rendered Muslims vulnerable from without. The corruption of knowledge made the umma vulnerable from within. A “holier than thou” attitude brought backwardness. The perception that all effects are produced by Allah is worrying. It leaves no room for freedom of the will. Is it just for God to punish wrongdoers for what He “predestined” them to perform? The teaching of predestination denies a significant part of the teaching of revelation. The relationship between cause and effect is an essential part of the teaching Islam. By rejecting causality, Ghazali denied a significant part of the teaching of revelation. He turned people into machines. Predestination rests on the assumption that Allah rules without regard to justice. This is problematic. It makes God appear as a caliph. The teachers of predestination cast God in the image of their rulers. This was to pacify the masses and make them less prone to rebellion. It did not work. The assaults on reason began with assaults on freedom. Contrary to the teaching of revelation, unreason became a key part of the faith. The traditionists belittled and rejected reason in favor of tradition. To be a Muslim, people were expected to refrain from using reason, especially in religion. But the attainment of knowledge requires the utilization of reason. Mystics also did not appreciate reason. They prepared the way for saint-worship. Theologians steeped in traditions rejected reason to follow tradition. The rejection of reason enabled the treatment of tradition as "revelation" and in that way corrupted the knowledge of revelation. Mysticism teaches that revelation is “beyond reason.” Mysticism undermined rationalism in Islam and paved the way for the fall of the Muslim Empire. For it is not possible to succeed without following revelation. And it is not possible to follow revelation without understanding revelation. Neither is it possible to understand revelation without the use of reason. Countless Muslims recite revelation without comprehending it. The unwillingness to use reason to know revelation blocked access to the knowledge of revelation. Tainted knowledge of revelation facilitated the turn to tradition. However, traditions could not guide as well as revelation. Those that followed traditions began to fall into error. The empire fell due to the errors of its rulers. These comprised the killing of the Mongol traders and ambassadors by the Abbasids. This triggered the annihilation of the Abbasids. Errors also included the twin assaults on Vienna, which ended in defeat and the fall of the Turkish empire. The reorientation from revelation to tradition was justified by the assertion that the predecessors possessed “better” knowledge of revelation. Being around the prophet was taken as evidence of better knowledge of revelation. But not everyone around the prophet embraced or understood revelation and its teaching. Traditionists are prophet-oriented; the rationalists are Allah-oriented. Traditionists follow traditions; rationalists follow revelation. After a time, tensions emerged between the rationalists and the traditionists. These tensions took on political expressions. They culminated in the slaughter of 5,000 philosophers in 786, by Musa al-Hadi, during the Age of Tradition. This foreshadowed the Reign of Terror by Maximilien Robespierre in 1792, during the French Revolution, the so-called Age of Reason in Europe, by a millennium. Following tradition in preference to revelation amounted to a turning away from revelation to tradition. After the passing of the prophet, following traditions was associated with following the prophet. This signalled the rise of tradition.

The umma is experiencing trauma. The umma is experiencing trauma because it exchanged the Book of Allah for books of traditions, resulting in sectarianism. To follow tradition rather than revelation is to treat persons as superior to Allah. Which person is a better guide than Allah? It is evident that the state of the umma changed. Allah said He does not alter the state of people until they change what is in themselves (Q, 13: 11). The umma used to be on top of the world. At present it finds itself nearer to the other end. The umma went from hero to zero. Why? The Book of Allah was not enough for the umma. It wanted more. So it turned to the ways of its forefathers. It turned from revelation to follow tradition. That is the chief cause of the umma’s downfall. The reorientation from revelation to tradition was triggered by an enchantment with tradition. The turn was assisted by the repression of reason. The repression of reason enabled tradition to mount a coup d’état, to usurp the place of revelation. The “coup” corrupted knowledge and triggered turmoil in the umma. The turn from revelation to tradition was backed by the assertion that tradition, too, was revelation. This rested upon problematic exegesis, which asserts that everything the prophet uttered was “revelation” from Allah. From then, matters went from bad to worse. Jurists did not pause at merely treating tradition as revelation (wahy). They further treat tradition as tanzil, what Allah “sent down.” But traditions are not the words of Allah. They are not even the words of the prophet. Traditions are paraphrases of paraphrases of what Muhammad allegedly said or did. They are not verbatim. Traditions are hearsay. To treat the words of mere persons as “revelation” is an expression of cavalier exegesis, exhibiting a failure to differentiate the rulings of Allah from reports of persons. The traditional ulama persisted in the promotion of tradition at the expense of revelation until tradition surpassed revelation. It was treated as a “judge” of revelation. This represented a reversal of the relationship between revelation and tradition. Revelation was subordinated to tradition. The Book of Allah was subordinated to books of traditions. This was a breakdown of rationality. Reversing the relationship between revelation and tradition harmed the umma enormously. Turning to tradition from revelation was tantamount to a relapse into shirk, following the way of the forefathers rather than the Book of Allah. Allah prohibited “adding” to revelation in chapter 69: 44-46 of the Book. Those who do not judge by what He “sent down” are referred to in the Book as unbelievers, rebels, and wrongdoers (5: 44-45, 47). The prophet prohibited the recording of his sayings, too. But hawkish rulers, in defiance of the prophet’s prohibition of the recording of his traditions, asked ulama to record the traditions. The effects would be troubling. The Mongols erased the Abbasids when Abbasid rulers acted in keeping with the tradition according to which “the blood of the kafir is halal for the believers.” Encouraged by this tradition, the Abbasids murdered a group of Mongol traders, as well as three ambassadors dispatched by Genghis Khan to ask for justice. This brazen defiance of the Book of Allah resulted in the deaths of a million persons in the reprisals that followed. Anti-rationalism also resulted in the deaths of five thousand philosophers, murdered by Musa al-Hadi in 786, during the mihna (inquisition). This was a “reign of terror,” a persecution of intellectuals by the adherents of traditions. But there was barely a whimper expressed at this atrocity. Anti-rationalism plunged Muslims into stupefaction and, due to the resulting backwardness, rendered the umma vulnerable to external assaults. Traditionists heed the traditions of their forefathers rather than the Book of Allah. They use the Book of Allah chiefly for ceremonial purposes. Muslims barely understand the Book of Allah when they recite it. Illiteracy of the Book is a problem. This is due to the demonization of reason. Reason was repressed by being subordinated to tradition. Even revelation was subordinated to tradition. The relationship between revelation and tradition in Islam requires attention. For tradition eclipsed revelation. This was an aberration. Traditional jurisprudence teaches that revelation is the foremost root of legislation. Tradition is treated as a “second” root of legislation. Yet in exegesis, the relationship between revelation and tradition is reversed. Tradition is placed above revelation. This reversal is expressed in the perceptions that “tradition judges revelation” and that “revelation requires tradition more than tradition requires revelation.” These are troubling perceptions. For they treat the rulings of persons as possessing greater authority than the rulings of Allah. Treating the rulings of persons as possessing greater authority than the rulings of Allah is an expression of scriptural shirk. The reversal of the relationship between revelation and tradition encroaches on the pre-eminence of revelation. It represents a breakdown of traditional exegesis and jurisprudence. Tradition experienced extraordinary ascent. It went from reports from past akin to hearsay to being treated as “revelation,” a “judge” of the Book of Allah, even capable of “abrogating” and “replacing” parts of the Book. The result is a sharia where reports of persons in a few places replace revealed rulings. This transpired with the punishments for adultery, apostasy and blasphemy. These punishments do not merely defy the Book of Allah; they also attribute an unjustified image of harshness to Islamic law and Muslims generally. Hence, the relationship between revelation and tradition requires being reset. Tradition must be subordinated to revelation. The teaching of abrogation was used to transform the religion of reconciliation into an agenda of territorial expansion and global conquest. Juristic and shirk tainted exegesis as well as jurisprudence. The politicisation of exegesis and jurisprudence reduced them to the rank of propaganda. These aberrations require attention. The rejection of reason resulted in a paralysis in the Muslim mind. The umma became mentally handicapped. The rejection of reason rendered the umma bereft of reason. The umma followed in the footsteps of al-Ghazali in his “breakdown” and also experienced a “breakdown.” This resulted in a culture of “intellectual retardation.” The rejection of reason paralyzed Muslim thought. It corrupted traditional exegesis and jurisprudence by rendering both irrational. The irrationality of traditional thought emerged in its errors. These encompassed the treatment of tradition as a root of legislation, the subordination of reason to tradition, and the teaching of abrogation in its different forms. The fall into irrationalism was evident in the re-articulation of the religion of reconciliation as a religion of war, the alleged tension between the realm of peace and the realm of war, and the teaching of wars of aggression or jihad al-talab. In rendering wars of aggression not merely permissible but required, a sixth pillar of Islam, the ulama rendered unlawful wars of aggression lawful. Is waging wars of aggression against non-Muslims merely because of their unbelief and for no other reason any different from “state terrorism”? This was the result of the rejection of reason and the abandonment of revelation to follow tradition or the ways of the predecessors. This was a transgression against religion. The corruption of knowledge entailed by these errors signalled disaster for the umma. It went on a rampage of unlawful wars on the pretext of “propagating” Islam by the sword. When the inevitable pushback came, the umma could not save itself. It remains in a state of subjection to this day. The umma has become the dhimmis. Allah turned the tables on the umma and Muslims are at present tasting the medicine they used to administer to non-Muslims. In brief, the umma fell from grace. Islam could provide the way out, were it not for the deformation of the knowledge of the religion by militant scholarship who, with their “explanation,” transformed a religion of reconciliation into an agenda for war. This was due to the rejection of reason and a capitulation to anti-rationalism. It is therefore necessary to return to reason and a reliable understanding of the teaching of revelation. This requires a rehabilitation of the traditional approach, which justified authoritarianism. It requires the rehabilitation and re-engagement of reason. It requires a return to reason. Traditional knowledge is less relevant than before. To cling to tradition at present is akin to relying on a roadmap prepared a millennium ago and expecting to reach the desired destination. The landscape changed considerably in the course of history.

The flaws in traditional methodology arise first and foremost from the rejection of reason as a foundation for providing knowledge of revelation. The turn from reason to tradition was catastrophic. It paved the way for a related catastrophic event, the turn from revelation to tradition. In this way, the authority of tradition surpassed both reason and revelation. The knowledge of revelation was subordinated to man-made reports without binding authority. The repression of revelation by tradition was followed by the subordination of revelation even to the pronouncements of the fuqaha, who emerged in the process of the re-arrangement of the roots of the law the chief authorities. The ijma or agreement of the ulema, according to the traditional perception, transcends everything. The result of the repression of reason to tradition was that unwarranted perceptions penetrated traditional exegesis and jurisprudence. It was accepted that reason is not equipped to understand revelation without the assistance of tradition. This transpired even though reason was used in the authentication of traditions in the first place. Further, it was assumed that tradition is revelation. This was tantamount to a fabrication of revelation. Treating tradition as revelation, according to man-made reports the rank of equality with the words of God is tantamount to textual polytheism. The text of revelation acquired “partners” in the form of the hadith anthologies. More than a hundred books of hadiths were accorded the rank of revelation, “similar” or even “equal” to revelation. This perception became widespread in defiance of the teaching of revelation which says that the Quran is unique and unlike anything else. It also amounted to associating with Allah what He gave no authority for (Quran, 7:33). In different words, the assertion that tradition is revelation was tantamount to a rejection of the uniqueness of the Quran. The effect of placing tradition on par with revelation was that tradition transcended revelation. Tradition surpassed revelation in three ways: first, reflecting the subordination of revelation to tradition, it was asserted that tradition “judges” revelation, Second, it was alleged that tradition may even “abrogate” revelation. The majority of the ulema from as early as 660 AD accepted that even a solitary hadith could abrogate a verse of the Book of Allah. Thus, it was claimed that rulings derived from tradition have the power to replace rulings in revelation. This applies in particular to rulings of apostasy, adultery and blasphemy. The rulings of men were permitted to overrule the rulings of Allah. This was a lapse into what we termed, “juristic polytheism.” Permitting the rulings of men to abrogate and replace the rulings of Allah corrupted significant parts of the sharia. This requires attention. It requires addressing aberrations that tainted traditional exegesis and jurisprudence. The repression of rationality emerged in the encounters between the followers of tradition and the rationalists. The traditionists besmirched reason to defeat the rationalists. The belittling of reasoning took place even though a few ulema argue that the protection of reason is among the purposes of the sharia. According to a hadith, the prophet referred to the use of ‘reason-based tafsir’ as disbelief (kufr). Muslims are expected to refrain from using reason in religion. Faith requires the sacrifice of reason on the altar of tradition. Traditionists treat abstaining from the use of reason in religion as an expression of piety. The treatment of reason in Islam reveals a checkered past. Anti-rationalism was propagated especially by the Sufis, who perceive persons who think as their enemies and the enemies of Islam. Traditionists allege that there is a “tension” between reason and revelation. The perception that equates reasoning with unbelief facilitated the proliferation of violence and accelerated the fall of the umma. For a civilization that does not value reason is doomed. It is by using reason that we access the knowledge of revelation. To this day we hear religious teachers advising their protégés against the perils of reasoning. The rejection of the relationship between causes and effects did a great disservice to Islam. For the rejection of the relationship between causes and effects entails a rejection of a large part of the teaching of revelation. Islam teaches that there is a relationship between the way we act and what we earn from it. If we are faithful and perform praiseworthy acts, we are rewarded with paradise. If we reject faith and perpetrate evil, we are rewarded with the fire. The rejection of reason also resulted in the backwardness of Muslims in the sciences and technology, which left them at the mercy of their enemies. Evidence of flawed reasoning is also encountered in the teaching of the purposes of the sharia. This teaching failed to emphasize justice as a purpose of the sharia. How to explain this glaring faux pas? For in the Book of Allah, justice is close to piety. In their backlash against the rationalists, who championed reason and justice, traditionists disregarded both. There are no books in Bukhari on justice, ethics and reason, essential parts of the teaching of revelation. Further evidence of flawed reasoning is found in the treatment of tradition as revelation, the perception that tradition judges revelation, and in the recourse to the teaching of abrogation. The rejection of reason facilitated the entry of a range of unwarranted perceptions and practices within exegesis and jurisprudence. These encompassed the perceptions that revelation is “ambiguous,” “deficient,” and “self-contradictory.” It was asserted that tradition explains revelation better than reason. Was any attention was paid to the fact that the explanation of revelation by tradition requires the use of reason, too? The subordination of reason to tradition was reflected in the perception that tradition was to be followed even against reason. The subordination of revelation to tradition was expressed in the perception that “tradition judges revelation” and that “revelation requires tradition more than tradition requires revelation.” Are these statements in keeping with the teaching of tauhid? The subjugation of reason and revelation to tradition tainted the knowledge of Islam. Folklore was expected to “explain” revelation, without the use of reason. The retreat from reason produced a paralysis in the Muslim mind. Inconsistent perceptions became embedded in exegesis as well as in jurisprudence. An example is the perception that traditions are “equal” to revelation and subordinate to revelation, at the same time. Another example is the replacement of parts of revelation by traditions. This resulted from the alleged abrogation of particular revealed verses by traditions. The teaching of abrogation enabled extensive tampering with the knowledge of revelation, deforming its teaching. The alleged abrogation of the peace verses by the ayah as-sayf transformed the teaching of peace into political Islam. It transformed Islam as the religion of peace into Islam as a religion of war seeking territorial expansion and global rule.

Fazlur Rahman referred to what he perceived was the “intellectual suicide” of traditional ulema. The person that rejects reason as a way for knowing revelation reduces his or her work to a rank of personal ponderings. Jurists refer to a responsible, sane person as a mukallaf. A person not in his or her right mind is not equipped to pronounce authoritatively on issues relating to religion. Pronouncing on matters relating to Islam require a person to be a mukallaf, to be in his right mind. To be in one’s right mind, requires the use of reason. The jurist that refrains from the use of God-given reason is not just ungrateful; he or she fails to meet the test of a responsible, sane or rational person. The person that refuses to use reason is irrational. An irrational person is insane. A mukallaf is a “sane” person. By abandoning reason, traditional exegetes and jurists forfeit their right to be treated as mukallafuna (plural of mukallaf). Accordingly, their right to pronounce with authority on Islam, in particular on exegesis and jurisprudence, is rendered problematic. The fact that traditional exegesis and jurisprudence are based on the rejection of reason renders the pronouncements of persons that do not use their reason unreliable. The Muslim umma waned because it turned from revelation to tradition. This transpired under the sway of persons with an aversion to reason. The failure to use reason because of the aversion to reason prevented Muslims from understanding and therefore following revelation. For following the guidance of Allah requires attaining knowledge of the Book of Allah. And accessing knowledge of revelation requires the use of reason. By prohibiting the use of reason in religion, traditionists prevent believers from approaching the Book of Allah, and hinder the pious from fi sabilillah: "The Qur’an was neglected almost entirely." "From the time the Muslim community abandoned the Qur’an and was overcome by confusion and error, its unity was lost." "The Muslim Ummah experienced these disasters because it had become alienated from the eternal truths of Islam." As a different writer put it: "the one and only reason for the social and cultural decay of the Muslims consisted in the fact that they had gradually ceased to follow the teachings of Islam." Another writer summed up the drift from revelation this way: "As the Muslim community began committing its oral cultural memories to writing in the mid-second century AH, the Qur’an was largely marginalized. As far as the Muslim laity were concerned, the Qur’an was ambiguous and susceptible to numerous interpretations. Hence, although the Qur’an was viewed as a major miracle, the only portion of it which was viewed as vitally important consisted in somewhere between 240 and 340 verses. Apart from these, the recorded Sunnah of the Prophet now became the primary text in dialogue with which the Muslim community’s “cultural memory” was to be molded. It was the hadiths that now served as the source from which the principles of Islamic jurisprudence were to be gleaned and as the basis for legal rulings on specific situations. So pivotal had the hadiths become that it was now possible to rely on them to the exclusion of all else, and impossible to dispense with them in favor of anything else." The turn from revelation to tradition produced troubling effects. "In consequence, the Qur’an’s role in Muslims’ lives was greatly diminished, their relationship to it now being restricted to recitation for the purpose of earning heavenly reward and gleaning moral lessons. The hadiths thus became the actual material out of which the Muslim mentality was shaped – until, that is, the hadiths themselves were superseded by a preoccupation with still other sources." The turn from revelation was problematic because: "the side effect that accompanied the collection of oral narratives was that – just as the leaders of the first Muslim generation had feared and cautioned against – people became so preoccupied with these narratives that they lost their focus on the Qur’an. The prophet attempted to prevent this. "Prophet made a point not to allow the Qur’anic text to be confused with any other. Similarly, he discouraged the Muslim community from preoccupying itself with any text other than the Qur’an, even if divine authority was claimed for it. God has rendered the Qur’an so complete that it contains the entire Islamic religion. It is the Qur’an that provides the explication of everything, while the Prophet’s example provides a comprehensive demonstration of how to apply everything taught in the Qur’an." The prophet did not want anything to compete with revelation. "The Messenger of God was determined not to allow believers’ minds and hearts to be occupied by anything that might set itself up as a rival to the Qur’an, or to let their attention be diverted by things far less worthy. Consequently, he warned the Muslim community against writing down, or concerning themselves with, anything but the Qur’an alone." Unfortunately, people insisted on becoming preoccupied with traditions. "However, once the Sunnah had been collected, the Muslim community did, in fact, neglect the Qur’an in favor of narrations of what the Prophet had done and said on the pretext that such narratives “contained” the Qur’an. They then abandoned the Sunnah narratives in favor of Islamic jurisprudence on the pretext that Islamic juristic texts tacitly included both the Qur’an and the Sunnah." The turn from revelation to tradition was catastrophic. But the abandonment of reason, which facilitated the turn from revelation to tradition in the first place, was also problematic. For without recourse to reason, no person is in a position to understand, let alone follow revelation. Reason is the “bridge” to knowledge. Without reason, a person will be unable to traverse the barriers placed on the highway to knowledge by traditionists. Persons that refrain from using reason place themselves at the mercy of persons that do not shy away from using their reason. They also place themselves at the risk of becoming inconsistent. "Scholars fell into inconsistencies by claiming that the Sunnah, while being an autonomous source of evidence for legal rulings, nevertheless occupies a lower status than the Qur’an. At the same time, they gave even solitary reports priority over the plain meaning of the Qur’an, which they had likewise designated ‘a solitary report." The alteration of focus from revelation to tradition was triggered by the repression of reasoning. Unfortunately, the result of the abandonment of reason in religion was confusion. For which rational person would expect better knowledge from tradition than from revelation? This research explores the causes and effects of the repression of reasoning on the Muslim civilization. It purposefully uses the cause-and-effect approach, in the belief that every cause produces an effect, and every effect takes place as a result of a cause. This is in keeping with the qadar or sunna of Allah. Persons that reject the relationship between causes and effects reject the qadar of Allah. They reject a significant part of the teaching of revelation. The renewal of Islam requires reconnecting with revelation rather than tradition, as it was tradition that triggered the fall of the Muslim umma, by endorsing the repression of reason and freedom, and failing to warn against the risks of turning from revelation to tradition. The fall of the umma was the result of the turn from revelation to tradition, triggered by the repression of reason.

This work explores “what went wrong” in Islam. The repression of reason facilitated the transformation of the teaching of Islam from a religion of reconciliation to a religion of confrontation. The repression of reason resulted in a corruption of knowledge. The corruption of knowledge emerged in the shape of the teaching of “aggressive jihad” or jihad al-talab. The articulation of aggressive jihad was enabled by recourse to the teaching of abrogation. The idea of spreading Islam by the sword was engineered at the behest of rulers that required a religious justification for waging wars of aggression. Spreading Islam by the sword was decreed to be a sixth pillar of Islam by hawkish ulema, eager to please their rulers. Aggressive jihad is derived from the teaching of abrogation. Both the teaching of abrogation and jihad al-talab represent aberrations in Muslim thought. The teaching of abrogation represents an aberration because it assumes that God “changed” His mind and “contradicted” Himself multiple times. A few ulema assert that there are as many as five-hundred instances of abrogation. The allegation that Allah “abrogates” His verses ascribes a personal trait to Him, that of “confusion.” In different words, the allegation that Allah “abrogates” His words is an expression of anthropomorphism. This runs counter to the verses in which we are assured that we will never find a change on the words of Allah. The teaching of aggressive jihad is an aberration because it enabled the replacement of Islam as a religion of peace by Islam as a political manifesto of aggression and empire building. This contradicts verses that teach that there is no coercion in religion. These aberrations were enabled by the deterioration of reasoning. This emerged from the encounters between the rationalists and the traditionalists regarding the exegesis of revelation. The repression of reason resulted in a paralysis of reason. The assumption that reason has no significant role to play in exegesis resulted in a breakdown of exegesis and jurisprudence. The paralysis of reason produced a range of adverse effects. It facilitated a misunderstanding of revelation, the elevation of tradition to revelation, the subordination of revelation to tradition and the subordination of revelation to the rulings of the ulema. The ulema became the chief authorities, with the power to "abrogate" and "replace" revelation. The results of the repression of reason by tradition were catastrophic. They encompass the emergence of Islamism, the treatment of aggressive jihad as a pillar of Islam, and the teaching of predestination. Because traditional exegesis and jurisprudence are predicated on the rejection of reason, exegetes and jurists that jettison reason withdraw from the ranks of the mukallafun, legally responsible persons in full possession of their rational faculty. In what way could work generated without the use of reason be treated as different from that produced by persons bereft of reason? The abandonment of reason facilitated the abandonment of revelation and its replacement first by tradition and then by the work of the ulema. The retreat from reason accounts for a range of problems in traditional exegesis and jurisprudence. It explains why jurists treat the prophetic traditions as “equal” and “subordinate” to revelation, at the same time. It also explains how jurists could reject reason and insist on its protection as a purpose (maqasid) of the sharia, simultaneously. These aberrations require attention. They require a “reconstruction of religious thought,” as Muhammad Iqbal put it. For by refusing to use reason in their work, traditional exegetes and jurists render their work unreliable and incoherent. Furthermore, it is to be recalled that relying on the work of a scholar written a millennium ago is akin to referring to a map that was prepared a thousand years earlier. The landscape changed and the map may not guide us to the right destination.

The knowledge of revelation is tainted by flawed translations. Better knowledge of revelation requires better translations of revelation. The corruption of knowledge results from flawed exegesis, that encompasses the teaching of abrogation. The teaching asserts that verses that teach peace were abrogated by verses that teach fighting. The advocates of this teaching assert that verse 9:5 “abrogated” a hundred and twenty “peace verses.” This is a remarkable assertion. It defies the teaching of revelation. The teaching of abrogation defies assurances in the Book of Allah, according to which we will never find any changes in the words of Allah. How would Allah “change” His words a hundred and twenty times? To embrace the teaching of abrogation is to reject the conviction that Allah protected the “reminder” as He promised. For Allah never breaks His promise. To accept the teaching of abrogation is to suggest that Allah “contradicted” Himself multiple times. This attributes a personal trait to Allah. For these reason, the teaching of abrogation must be set aside. The abrogation of the peace verses by the “sword verse” adversely affects the relations between Muslims and the West. The teaching of abrogation paved the way for the emergence of the putative clash of civilizations, between the dar al-Islam and the dar al-harb, “the abode of peace” and “the abode of war.” Unfortunately, following the teaching of the struggle between the realm of peace and the realm of unbelief brought wars of aggression or the “propagation” of Islam by the sword. The policies of expansion brought disaster on Muslims as well as on non-Muslims. Recasting the Muslim faith as a religion of war was enabled by the putative “abrogation” of the verses of reconciliation by the ayah as-sayf. The rendition of Islam as a religion of war represents a corruption of its teaching. The transformation of the religion of peace into a religion of war was buttressed by recourse to traditions that reflect a hawkish perception of revelation. Traditional ulama transformed the teaching of reconciliation into a teaching of confrontation to further the political agendas of rulers to expand the empire. Translations of the Book of Allah are tainted by the misrepresentations of the teaching of revelation. The corruption of the knowledge of revelation is in part a result of the disparagement of reason for the purpose of understanding revelation. Reason was disparaged because of the fear that the “reasoning” of exegetes could be exposed as flawed, when exposed to rational scrutiny. The prohibition of the use of reason for the purpose of understanding revelation assisted in shielding the errors of the exegetes from exposure. Unfortunately, it also resulted in a corruption of the knowledge of revelation. Translations of revelation are affected by the understandings of revelation. Islam is not free from misinterpretations of the teaching of revelation. Knowledge of revelation was tainted by a series of aberrations. The aberrations represent different phases in the emergence of despotism, which affected the teaching of revelation. Methodological aberrations encompass the repression of reason, the repression of freedom, and the repression of revelation by tradition and the rulings of the ulama. The emergence of authoritarianism was triggered by the corruption of the knowledge of revelation. The corruption of the knowledge of revelation was triggered by turning from revelation to tradition. At the political level, the corruption of the knowledge was reinforced by the relapse from the rule of the “rightly guided caliphs” to the absolutism of the Umayyads. This period witnessed the rise of repression, religious as well as political. The repression of freedom began with the repression of the belief in free will. This transpired with the emergence of feudalism under the Umayyads. There was an emphasis on traditions. Traditions could be used as hikma (wisdom) or to explore the background of revelation. They cannot, however, be used as a root of Islamic law. For legislation in religion is the exclusive prerogative of Allah. The error of the ulama was not that they treated traditions as part of the legacy of Islam; after all it is a part of that legacy. The error was in the way they embedded tradition into the religion. For they treat tradition as a “partner” and even a “part of” revelation. This is expressed in the belief that “tradition is revelation.” A few even treat tradition as a “controlling partner” of revelation. This is expressed in the idiom that “tradition judges the Book.” Tradition requires being treated as subordinate to and separate from revelation; not as an “equal of” or “superior to” revelation. It is necessary, as Fazlur Rahman argued, to differentiate between the Islam of the Book of Allah and the Islam of the hadiths. The two should neither be fused nor confused. Religion should not be confused with its history. Repression intensified when autocratic rule replaced consultative rule (shura), as prescribed in revelation (sura 42). The repression of freedom intensified in the struggles between the free willers and the proponents of predestination. Persuading the umma that all events are predestined reduced dissatisfaction among the people, as rulers would assert that everything that transpired was predestined. A few events are foretold, for example that the pious will be rewarded and the transgressors punished. But not everything is predetermined. This is the perception of extremists, who fault Allah for the crimes of persons, a truly blasphemous perception. Predestination of all events would make Allah responsible for all misdeeds of His servants. If everything was predestined, Allah’s revelation would be superfluous. It would make no difference, as all persons would be “programmed” to do what they did. The Umayyads rejected free will, even though revelation endorses free will. They persecuted the free willers. We are free to acknowledge the truth or to turn away. Analogously, good and evil results are earned according to people’s acts. The advocates of free will encompassed the ahl al-kalam. They adhered to the Book of Allah alone. They were forerunners of the ahl al-ray or the rationalists. The rivals of the free willers, the Jabarites, were the precursors of the ahl al-hadith or traditionists. It is necessary to abandon the teaching of predestination because it is corrupting not just the knowledge of revelation but also the ability of Muslims to adapt to evolving realities. Predestination is alien to revelation. Allah teaches that we choose our “fate” by the acts we take or fail to take. The teaching of predestination makes the umma passive by encouraging resignation to fate. Backwardness, semi-literacy and poverty are attributable to an extent to fatalism. For fatalism reduces the motivation of Muslims to better themselves. It achieves this by making them think that their fates are predetermined by Allah. To try to change it, in their eyes, would be tantamount to defying the decree of Allah. The proliferation of predestination was reinforced by the repression of reason by tradition. Muslims were asked by traditionists to suppress their reason. Muslims were expected to follow tradition, even when it defied the dictates of reason. This resulted in the perception that Muslim are required to follow tradition even when it defies reason. Regrettably, Muslims at times follow tradition even when it defies revelation, as in the cases of the rulings on apostasy, blasphemy and adultery. Preferring tradition at the expense of revelation proved disastrous to the umma. A million Muslims perished in the Mongol retaliation for the unjust and un-Islamic execution of body of Mongol traders and ambassadors, dispatched by Genghis Khan to ask for justice for the killers. Just under five centuries before, in 786, Musa al-Hadi murdered five thousand philosophers for being “free thinkers.” There is an uncanny resemblance between the repression of free willers under the Umayyads and the repression of the rationalists under the Abbasids. Reasoning was frowned upon, and all that was required was to follow tradition without question. In the wake of the rejection of reason, taqlid or the unquestioning adherence to tradition became widespread. Muslims began to follow the traditions of the predecessors rather than what the predecessors followed: revelation. The repression of reason enabled the emergence of the putative “clash” between reason and revelation. The epistemological partition between reason and revelation hampered the development of technology in the Muslim world. The fear of reason is predicated on the presupposition that reason and revelation are adversaries rather than allies. The repression of reason was reinforced with the shutting of the gates to ijtihad. https://amazon.com.au/dp/B0CT4F8DS2 https://amazon.com/dp/B0CT4F8DS2 https://amazon.co.uk/dp/B0CT4F8DS2 https://amazon.ca/dp/B0CT4F8DS2

Muslims are experiencing problems due to a misunderstanding of Islam. The misunderstanding of revelation resulted from the repression of reason by Muslim tradition. Reason is gift from Allah. To reject the blessing of reason betrays ungratefulness, which is among the meanings of kufr. Reason is disparaged by persons that feel threatened by it. The fear of reason precipitated the extermination of 5,000 rationalists by Musa al-Hadi during the mihna or Inquisition of 786. The killing of the philosophers confirms that “orthodoxy” was established by force rather than arguments. The persons that perpetrated this atrocity were not well versed in argumentation. Thus, they resorted to violence to force their perceptions on the umma through coercion, prohibited by revelation. The misunderstanding of revelation encouraged extremists to follow their passions. The misunderstanding was the result of traditional exegesis, which requires understanding revelation through the prism of tradition. Traditional exegesis treats traditions as a furqan of revelation. This is reflected in the perceptions that tradition “judges” revelation, and that revelation requires tradition more than tradition requires revelation. By treating tradition rather than revelation as the furqan, traditional exegesis defied tauhid. Treating tradition as a “judge” of revelation is tantamount to scriptural shirk. The traditional approach entails the repression of reason. But the refusal to use reasoning to understand revelation made it harder to understand revelation. It rendered traditional exegesis unreasonable and unreliable. The assumptions that render the traditional exegesis unreliable comprise the perception that reason is the enemy of revelation, that reason is subordinate to tradition, and that tradition may “judge,” “abrogate,” and “replace” parts of revelation. The repression of reason enabled the emergence of perceptions that defy revelation, the perceptions that revelation is “unclear,” “incomplete,” and “incoherent.” Problematic assumptions encompass the perception that tradition is “equal” to revelation and that tradition is a root of the sharia. These perceptions generated unwelcome effects. The allegation that tradition is equal to revelation embedded scriptural shirk in exegesis. The perception that tradition may “abrogate” and replace the rulings of revelation by rulings from tradition embedded juristic shirk in traditional jurisprudence. The embedding of scriptural and juristic shirk into the fabric of the religious knowledge corrupted knowledge and a warped the penal code. The death penalties for blasphemy, apostasy and adultery, were incorporated into Islamic law without endorsement in revelation. These punishments embedded extremism into the law. The punishments were drawn from tradition rather than revelation. They result in injustice and impart to Islam a reputation for cruelty. The shirk at the foundation of the exegesis of revelation renders the knowledge brought by traditional exegesis and jurisprudence unreliable. Thus, requires reconstruction and rehabilitation. The reconstruction of religious knowledge requires a return to reason and the affirmation of the preeminence of revelation in relation to all tradition. Reconstruction also requires the affirmation of revelation as the foundation of all legislation in religion. It requires a return to a rational methodology of understanding revelation.

Traditional Islam is presented to us as an “unbroken” and reliable chain, the way the hadiths are presented. But an examination reveals a different reality. In a striking contrast to the traditional account, there was a break with the tradition of the prophet. Islam we perceive at present differs from the Islam of the prophet. It was affected by the politicisation of exegesis and the rejection of reason. This is troubling, as the abandonment of reason in their interpretation of revelation placed all ulema that embraced this perception, in the ranks of the non-mukallafun, or persons bereft of reason. This rendered them not responsible from the perspective of jurisprudence. The repression of reasoning, by associating its use in understanding revelation with kufr, produced troubling effects. These encompass the subordination of reason to tradition, an impaired knowledge of revelation, the subordination of revelation to tradition and the rulings of the ulema, and the emergence of teachings alien to revelation: abrogation, predestination, and jihad al-talab or aggressive jihad. A religion that requires following “revelation” that the prophet did not follow, and that did not emerge until centuries after his demise, could hardly be perceived as “traditional” by any stretch of the imagination. There was a break with the tradition of the prophet. For he followed the Book of Allah; he did not follow his “traditions.” This was aggravated by the gatherings of “traditions,” which was performed in defiance of the prohibition by the prophet of recording his traditions. Hence, tradition as recorded in the anthologies of traditions represents a break with the tradition of the prophet, which was to follow the Book of Allah. The abandonment of the Book of Allah to judge by personal reports analogous to hearsay, which are the words of the transmitters rather than the verbatim words of the messenger, is palpable in the presence of the extreme punishments in penal law. For the prophet did not kill for sins (blasphemy and apostasy). And the punishment for adultery is a hundred lashes, not stoning to death. These extreme punishments are from traditions that defy the Book of Allah. The incorporation of these penalties for apostasy, adultery and blasphemy is a breach of the rulings of Allah. The fact that practically all rulings are inferred from personal reports – non-revealed sources – reveals that man-made rulings replaced revealed rulings. What is responsible for things going so wrong? For replacing the revealed rulings of Allah with man-made reports is tantamount to treating the rulings of persons as higher than the rulings of Allah. At the root of the problems is a flawed method. And the core of the flawed method is the rejection of rationality. With the marginalisation of reason in the study of revelation, exegesis and jurisprudence became unreasonable. The rejection of reason in the exegesis of revelation corrupted its method. For without the use of reason it is hardly possible to understand anything, including revelation. As a result of the rejection of reasoning, the religious sciences, not to mention the persons that elaborated them, became unreasonable and thus unreliable. Anti-rationalism brought tremendous harm to the umma. It resulted in the deterioration of reasoning and a de-intellectualization of the ummah. The corruption of knowledge of revelation followed. The rejection of reason rendered understanding revelation extra challenging. In desperation, believers turned to tradition, the practices of their forefathers. The effective prohibition of the use of reasoning began before the shutting of the gates to ijtihad. It emerged in the struggles between the rationalists and the traditionists, regarding the interpretation of revelation.