Advancements in the field of biological research are moving faster now than ever before. At the same time, these biological innovations have a ‘dual use’ potential of which researchers may not be aware. While on the one hand they may provide solutions to many of the world’s problems, on the other hand they may potentially be abused, mishandled or used for hostile purposes. As a result of these possible ‘dark’ uses of biotechnology, it is imperative that a dynamic international regime be put in place to meet, in a comprehensive manner, the multi-layered aspects of the new security challenges that biological advances now pose. The current international regime, led by the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), has succeeded in setting normative standards governing non use by states of biological weapons in warfare. However, these shall soon be insufficient to cope with the rapid and momentous changes expected in the field of biotechnology in this century. The new regime must bring together the fields of industry, science and various non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to build together an effective web of response to the dark potentialities of biotechnology advances. Such a web implies a network of different solutions and organisations to tackle the problem. Indeed, there is no one single ‘magic’ solution to combating the multi-faceted nature of biological research advances, and the coordinated international response must reflect this.

A major consideration in Bio security and Bio defence is whether fungi should be excluded from the US government select agents list and other similar documentation. The mortality of spontaneous fungal infection is indeed low, but it is not an important factor for weaponizing a pathogen. The disruptive effect may be the true aim. Low contagiousness of fungi is also desirable to restrict the infection to the intended targets, while simplifying recruitment and training, and the handling of the device. Spore-generating fungi are easier to weaponize than bacteria, the natural occurring forms of which are not readily suitable for weaponization. As technology progresses, the genetic manipulation is not just to augment a microbe’s pathogenicity. Once such procedures are established, the microbe is not the weapon, but the vector for a preferably allogenic toxin or bio regulator. Τhe suitability formula proposed for calculating the Weapon Potential of a microbe includes vital parameters such as inoculum size, contagiousness, stability of the agent, inoculation time but others, with operational significance, such as undetectability, availability of medical countermeasures and circumstantial suitability are not mentioned at all. Such pitfalls should be addressed if the formula is to assist decision-makers to focus their vigilance according to available intelligence.

In light of the quandaries presented by domestic law, has the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 (“BWC”) also been so outpaced by the technologies that it is no longer effective and meaningful in international law? Part II will examine the continuum of official actions that have attempted to keep pace with the growing biotechnologies that may present threats to global biosecurity through interpreting the BWC. Part III looks at how these definitions may not be sufficient. Finally, Part IV looks at other mechanisms that may provide a better way of controlling biological weapons than redefining the technologies through the current processes.

Bioterrorism is the deliberate or threatened use of biological agents; viruses, bacteria, toxins or other agents to cause illness or death in people, animals, or plants. Since most priority bioterrorism agents are zoonotic in origin, there is a heightened awareness and concern about the possibility of bioterrorism involving animals. Veterinarians and livestock owners may be the first to diagnose the early cases of a bioterrorist act, as livestock can be sentinels of such an exposure. List of the most likely biological agents to be used in an act of bioterrorism had been prioritized and these agents are classified into A, B and C categories. Category A agents and disease are easily transmitted from animals to human, (except for smallpox, which has no animal reservoir) person to person, having high mortality rates and potential for a major public health impact. Category B agents and disease are moderately easy to disseminate and result in moderate morbidity rates and low mortality rates. Category C agents and diseases include emerging pathogens that could be engineered for mass dissemination. Although society has limited ability to prevent bioterrorist attacks, there still is a need to take preventative steps to reduce potential risks for such attacks. Increased laboratory scrutiny for disease agents, greater controls for investigations involving these pathogens and other security measures implemented, are necessary to restrict access to dangerous biological agents. Detection of disease in animals may be essential in predicting a bioterrorism event since most threat agents of bioterrorism are microbes causing zoonotic diseases. Veterinarians and veterinary diagnostic laboratories should become a part of nationwide active surveillance for category A, B, and C agents and diseases, as well as for new and emerging bioterrorism agents.