This article compares the instruments of statecraft used to construct grand strategies in the early years of the Cold War—the Truman and Eisenhower administrations—with the Bush administration’s grand strategy and the Global War on Terror (GWOT). It argues that the Bush strategy relied heavily on the military instrument of statecraft in attempts of defeating Al-Qaeda and did not develop robust and concerted diplomatic, psychological and economic tools to undermine Al-Qaeda’s ideology and influence. The early days of the Cold War hold valuable lessons for crafting an integrated grand strategy that can fight both the Al-Qaeda network and its ideology.

To counter the current and emerging Al Qaeda-IS hybrid threat, the US seeks to build a global ecosystem resistant to the pernicious ideology of terrorist groups. For lasting impact, the US and its allies need to address both the ideality and reality of global conflict.

Since 1823, United States have followed three grand strategies. These three strategies, which include Continentalism (1823-1945), Realist Internationalism (1945-1991) and Liberal Internationalism (1991-2001), were used to provide security against external threats based on the existent definition of enemy and threat from 1823 to 11th September 2001. Events of September 11th affected the main assumptions of the strategies were followed by United States previously. The article is to explain the mentioned strategies and the changes in their assumptions.

Great power competition is today’s defining strategic issue. Crucially this competition is seen as remaining below the level of great power armed conflict, instead ranging across diverse areas including economic, diplomatic, cyber, information campaigns and proxy wars. Such diversity gives the great powers much more choice in the grand strategies they could potentially use to advance their interests than during the Cold War bi-polar confrontation. In sharp contrast, American grand strategy thinking has today been captured by a single approach.

The war on al-Qaeda and its affiliates appears to be endless but every war must end. Winding down the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq has been difficult, but both were embedded in what was then called the ‘war on terrorism.’ What does ‘success’ in that war mean? With the death of bin Laden and the increase in drone operations, how far is the US from achieving it? Can this war end? The article analyzes the ongoing US response to the 9/11 attacks in historical context, revealing four patterns common to all prolonged wars: means become ends, tactics become strategy, boundaries are blurred, and the search for a perfect peace replaces reality. It concludes by laying out an effective strategy for ending the war.